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Abstract
Starting a firm with expansive potential is an option for educated and high-skilled workers.
If there are labor market frictions, this additional option can be seen as reducing the chances
of ending up in a low-wage job and hence as increasing the incentives for education. In a
matching model, we show that reducing the start-up costs for new firms results in higher
take-up rates of education. It also gives rise—through a thick-market externality—to higher
rates of job creation for high-skilled labor as well as average match productivity. We provide
empirical evidence to support our argument.
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I. Introduction
In many countries, the importance of entrepreneurship is gaining more and
more attention.1 The prime arguments in support of creating new businesses
concern innovation, the adaptability of economies towards new opportuni-
ties, and expansion of the “boundaries of economic activity”; see OECD
∗ Winter-Ebmer thanks the Austrian Science Funds (P15422-G05) for financial support.
We are grateful for comments by Neil Foster and Thomas Hintermaier as well as seminar
participants in Prague and Vienna. We thank two anonymous referees for helpful suggestions
on earlier versions of the paper.
1 See, for example, Commission of the European Communities (1999) and OECD (1998a,b).
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(1998b). Governments and Chambers of Commerce argue that reduced
start-up costs for new businesses are a potential cure for the ailing
European labor market.
Reductions in start-up costs can take two forms. One is to reduce the
bureaucratic hurdles that form part of the start-up costs for new firms.2
The second is to provide institutions for venture capital as well as public
financial support for new firms.3
In this paper we study the implications of lower start-up costs in a situ-
ation where new firms (at least, those with high productivity) can only be
set up by high-skilled persons. Lower start-up costs then affect education
choices by improving the options of skilled workers. More workers obtain
education and more high-skill firms will be set up, which is the first divi-
dend. The increase in the proportion of workers who are educated triggers,
through a search externality, a second dividend: because the odds of getting
high-skilled workers to apply for a given vacancy go up, already existing
firms create more jobs for high-skilled workers. We provide a model that
identifies both these effects.
The current literature on establishing new firms focuses on the firm
level and the effects of new firms on existing markets.4 Our contribution
is to endogenize education decisions in this framework. Is there, however,
any “prima facie” empirical indication that lower start-up costs are related
to educational choices? Figures 1 and 2 indeed show that two separate
measures of start-up costs—the number of days it takes to set up a new firm
and the availability of start-up financing—correlate with education choices.
At the very minimum, these graphs suggest there is some merit in further
investigating a positive link between low start-up costs and incentives for
high-skilled education.
Our matching model is in the vein of Pissarides (2000) and Fonseca,
Lopez-Garcia and Pissarides (2001). In equilibrium, high-skilled workers
first search for a high-skilled vacancy in existing firms. Search frictions
2 Start-up costs are often regarded as entry costs. On example is Blanchard and Giavazzi
(2003) who interpret product market deregulation as start-up cost reduction in a general
equilibrium model. They study how employment and wages are affected by product and
labor market deregulation.
3 Another aspect of venture capital and its effect on labor markets is discussed theoretically
and empirically by Belke, Fehn and Foster (2003). In a matching framework, they argue that
the availability of venture capital helps to select better managers.
4 Much empirical research can be found on these issues. To name two examples: Audretsch,
Santarelli and Vivarelli (1999) study industry dynamics and the extent to which the survival
of new firms depends on start-up costs and industry characteristics. Gans, Hsu and Stern
(2002) consider empirically the effects of start-up costs on trade in ideas, innovation and the
founding of new firms in an industry.
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Fig. 1. Venture capital and tertiary school enrollment
Sources: UN World Development Indicators and Porter, Sachs, Warner, Cornelius, Levinson
and Schwab (2002).
prevent a perfect match between high-skilled vacancies and high-skilled job
seekers. Some high-skilled unemployed then opt for setting up new firms
until the value of outside low-skilled employment equalizes the value of
creating a new firm. The equilibrium proportion of high-skilled vacancies
is then determined by the proportion of high-skilled workers in the pool of
unemployed, which links the proportion of high-skilled vacancies with the
outside option for high-skilled workers of setting up a new firm. This gives
rise to a matching externality: a larger share of high-skilled workers will
increase the profitability of posting a high-skill vacancy for existing firms.
This increases the number of high-skilled vacancies created when start-
up costs for new firms decrease. Through this “thick-market externality”,
higher education rates lead to more job creation for high-skilled workers,
thereby again adding to the incentives to invest in education. Under the
specific assumptions of our model, lower start-up costs increase production
and reduce the number of workers who fill low-skilled jobs.
Empirical evidence suggests that education does not affect the selec-
tion of entrepreneurs but rather their performance; see the survey by Le
(1999) and the meta studies by Van der Sluis, Van Praag and Vijvenberg
(2003, 2005). Given that the effects on education are at the core of our
interest, we accommodate this observation by focusing on start-ups in the
high-tech (high-performance) sector, which are only feasible for educated
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Fig. 2. Time to start a firm and tertiary school enrollment
Sources: UN World Development Indicators and Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and
Shleifer (2002).
(high-skilled) individuals.5 We abstract from the employment effects of
start-up costs on low-skilled labor by assuming that matching is fric-
tionless on the low-skilled market. There are three reasons for doing so:
first, it simplifies the analysis; second, it can be interpreted as a situation
where unemployed low-skilled workers can always set up a firm (the often
observed self-employed street vendors); and third, it simply models the sit-
uation where there exists a given expected return once a worker enters the
low-skilled labor market.
Closest to our approach are Fonseca et al. (2001) and Pissarides (2003)
who study the effects of start-up costs in a matching model where work-
ers are heterogeneous with respect to the potential profit of starting a new
firm. Both contributions focus on the job-creation effect of start-ups. We
focus on the effect on education choices. Although Fonseca et al. (2001)
5 Devine (1994) discusses the development of self-employment over time with a particular
emphasis on returns to education. She finds that, for the U.S., self-employment increased
the most for workers who faced rising potential earnings in salaried employment over time,
which implicitly would mean that earnings potential in the self-employed sector has risen
relatively more. The importance of formal education as well as experience might be very
diverse across countries due of different regulatory requirements for starting a business; see
Luber, Lohmann, M¨ uller and Barbieri (2000).
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and Pissarides (2003) do not consider education, they also argue that lower
start-up costs lead to the creation of more firms and less unemployment.
The effect of reducing start-up costs on the efficiency of the market is am-
biguous in their model: if too many workers start new firms, the workforce
may become too small and output suffers. In contrast, lower start-up costs
are always beneficial for the economy in our model.
A related line of enquiry is the link between education choices and search
frictions. Acemoglu (1996) provides the basic intuition: workers decide on
their investment in education before knowing whether they will be able
to find a high-skilled job. A higher proportion of educated workers then
prompts more firms to creat such jobs, thus implying a wedge between
private and social returns to education. Burdett and Smith’s (2002) “low
skill trap” is based on a similar intuition. They provide a model with search
frictions in which multiple equilibria exist, where firms offer either too few
or too many high-skilled jobs and workers either acquire or refrain from
acquiring skills.6 These papers differ from ours in that search frictions in
our model are bounded by the option of setting up one’s own firm.
Other policy options that affect the education choice of individuals
are considered in the matching literature. Belot (2003) models education
choices and migration options under labor market frictions. She argues that
policies which increase migration possibilities also increase the incentives
to invest in education. Another policy option is unemployment insurance,
which effectively reduces the importance of unemployment risks and hence
stimulates the unemployed to look for higher-paying riskier jobs. Acemoglu
and Shimer (1999) show that unemployment insurance can thus be output
increasing when the unemployed are risk averse. When the possibility of
taking a risky job is related to particular education choices, unemployment
benefits affect education choices.
Our baseline model in Section II captures the basic search-friction ar-
gument. In Section III, the baseline model is extended by introducing the
opportunity for high-skilled persons to start a new firm. We discuss and
interpret the comparative statics of the model. Section IV contains empir-
ical evidence that supports the main prediction of our model: the positive
effect of start-up costs on skill acquisition. Section V concludes.
6 Masters (1998) studies the differences between wage bargaining and fixed rent-sharing
agreements in a model with investment in capital by firms and investment in education
by workers. He finds that inefficiencies in the market have to be attributed to both search
frictions and inefficiencies in the determination of wages.
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II. A Matching Model with Education
The Basic Model
The economy consists of a fixed large number of firms and N workers. We
consider a matching model with two time periods. In period one the workers
in the economy decide whether to enroll in education and firms choose the
number of vacancies for high- and low-skilled jobs. In the second period,
firms and workers are matched and production takes place.
With respect to the cost of education, workers have an innate ability θ ∈
[0;1]. Ability is distributed across the population following a continuous
cumulative distribution function Q(θ) on the support of [0, 1]. Workers
who choose to invest in education incur a cost of e(θ). By assumption,
higher ability individuals have lower costs of education, i.e., de(θ)/dθ <
0. To guarantee an interior solution we assume that education is costless to
the most gifted person (e(1) = 0) and impossible to achieve for the least
gifted (e(0) =∞ ). In all subsequent arguments, this will lead to a cut-off
ability z above which workers become educated and below which they do
not. Then, 1 − Q(z) is the share of workers becoming educated.7
Firms can offer two types of jobs: low-skilled jobs and high-skilled jobs.
Posting a low- (high-)skilled vacancy imposes costs of cl(ch) on the firm.
We denote the overall number of vacancies as Vl and Vh. Low-skilled jobs
can be performed by any type of worker whereas high-skilled jobs can
only be filled by high-educated workers. Matching individuals to high-
skilled jobs is by assumption more difficult than matching individuals to
low-skilled jobs. For simplicity, we assume frictionless matching on the
low-skill labor market, i.e., there is a spot market for low-skilled jobs. The
number of low-skilled matches equals Ml = min {Nl ;Vl}, where Nl and Vl
refer to the number of workers seeking low-skilled jobs and the number of
low-skill vacancies, respectively. Think of low-skilled jobs as hamburger-
flipping positions which can be found at virtually no cost at all.8
With respect to high-skilled jobs we assume that matching frictions are
captured by a constant returns to scale matching function m(Nh, Vh). The
number of educated workers Nh is equal to (1 − Q(z))N. The number of
successful high-skilled matches equals Mh = m((1 − Q(z))N, Vh). Unsuc-
cessfully educated workers enter the low-skill labor market, which means
7 Note that ability is defined here as needing less cost (effort) to acquire skills through
education. Acquiring skills itself is in principle open to all, but the choise to invest in the
necessary education is endogenous.
8 Assuming frictions on the market for low-skilled labor do not change the basic story because
a higher probability of unemployment merely increases the value of the option to start a new
firm. Furthermore, this assumption can be interpreted as reflecting a spot market for the
output of the low-skilled self-employed.
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we assume that matching takes place first for high-skilled jobs and then for
low-skilled jobs. The number of individuals prepared to accept low-skilled
jobs thus equals N − Mh .
A successful match has productivity pl, ph, respectively. We assume
that wages in successful matches are determined by instantaneous Nash
bargaining where the power of workers is independent of education and
equals β: wages are given as wl = βpl and wh = βph.9 To ensure that
production takes place we assume (1 − β)pj >cj, j ∈ {l, h} . If this
did not hold, there would be no low-skilled (high-skilled) workers at work,
which is a trivial case.
Analysis of the Basic Model
We start with the behavior of firms with respect to low-skilled jobs. Firms
will obviously set up low-skilled vacancies when there is a surplus in doing
so. This is the case given the assumption larger productivity: (pl − wl)i s
by assumption larger than cl. To maximize profits, firms will post vacancies
as long as the marginal expected profit is non-negative. This “free entry”










This must be higher than N − Mh because pl − wl >cl, which shows that
there is an oversupply of low-skilled vacancies. This is rent dissipation.
The number of individuals who choose to become educated is deter-
mined by the condition that the marginal individual is indifferent between










(wl − e(z)) = wl. (2)
9 To be strict, we assume that bargaining takes place after matches were formed, i.e., once a
worker and a firm start bargaining, both lose the option to find another match. In case of
disagreement, both receive a payoff of 0.
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(ph − wh) = ch. (3)
The following proposition states the result for the basic model.
Proposition 1. In the basic model with education and low- and high-
skilled jobs there exists a unique equilibrium, described by a set { ˜ V h, ˜ Vl,  z}
where ˜ V h, ˜ Vl,  z denotes the equilibrium number of high- and low-skilled
vacancies and the cut-off ability, respectively.
Proof: The proof runs via standard arguments: the productivity and the
bargaining power uniquely determine Vl. Equations (2) and (3) determine
  Vh and  z. Only one solution exists because for a given z, the marginal profit
of an extra high-skilled vacancy is monotonically decreasing in Vh. This
implies there is only one (finite) level of Vh for any given z. Finally, the
value of becoming high skilled is monotonically increasing in θ because of
decreasing education costs. Due to the assumptions on e(·), there will be a
unique level of z at which an individual is indifferent. This level is   z.I n
the simple model we hence have a unique equilibrium set { ˜ V h, ˜ Vl,  z}. 
III. Business Start-ups
Model Extension
We now introduce the possibility for educated workers to start a business.
The type of business we have in mind obviously has high productivity. This
means that we abstract from “new firms” which are actually a form of
low-skilled employment such as street vending. This assumption is empir-
ically supported by the observed link between education and performance
of entrepreneurship, indicating that educated entrepreneurs usually enter
high-performance/innovative industries.
An individual who sets up his/her own high-skilled production job has to
bear the cost SC. We assume that firms are more efficient in setting up such
jobs than the unemployed are and that β is large enough such that accepting
a high-skilled job in a firm is more attractive to an educated worker than
starting a business: wh > ph − SC or SC > (1 − β)ph.10 This assumption
10 Note that adding the option to hire other workers once a firm is started does not affect
the return to starting a new firm. This is due to rent dissipation on both labor markets.
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implies SC > ch, which reveals the intuition for the existence of firms in
this economy, namely that economies of scale exist: a firm is more efficient
than the unemployed in creating new jobs. To ensure that starting a firm
is attractive for an educated worker who is hit by labor market friction,
we assume wl < wh − SC or SC < β (ph − pl).11 Otherwise the new
option of starting a business has no value because educated workers prefer
to work in a low-skilled job rather than set up a new firm. To summarize,
we consider the case where the option to start a firm is attractive to an
educated worker hit by labor market frictions: wh > ph − SC > wl.12 All
other cases are trivial.
According to our model, starting a firm is attractive for all high-skilled
workers who were unable to find high-skilled vacancies in existing firms.
Empirical evidence, as in Hamilton (2000), suggests that non-pecuniary
aspects of self-employment also matter and that there is heterogeneity in
the non-pecuniary benefits of becoming one’s own boss. Others, such as
Connelly (1992) and Lohmann (2001), argue that females might value
increased flexiblity in self-employment more than males, in particular if
they have small children. Our model does not explicitly incorporate a non-
pecuniary utility from “being one’s own boss”. Adding a heterogeneous
non-pecuniary benefit of starting a firm would be an interesting extension
of the model, but it would not change the basic conclusion that reductions
in start-up costs will increase the returns to education and thus increase
the proportion of the population that acquires education. It might, however,
affect the double dividend if the non-pecuniary aspect of a job turned out to
be so high for some individuals that the condition SC > (1 − β)ph would
only hold for a fraction of the population and fail to hold for others. In such
a case, it may be that reduced starting costs actually decrease the number
of high-skilled workers who apply for existing vacancies (they immedi-
ately start a firm rather than first try the existing firms), in which case
existing firms will not necessarily increase their number of high-skilled
vacancies when more people become educated and the second dividend
disappears.
11 Workers in our model compare the payoff of starting a new firm to that of entering the
low-skilled labor market because this is their only outside option (by construction, they have
been unable to find a high-skilled job in an existing firm).
12 Given that we assume a frictionless low-skilled labor market, the option to start a firm
by low-skilled workers is of no importance. In comparing with data for self-employment, as
in Blanchflower (2004), where starting a firm is also an option often used by low-skilled
workers, it may be argued that the frictionless low-skilled market is a valid assumption if
the losses from starting a firm are small (zero) for low-skilled workers (i.e., in our model
βpl ≥ pl − SCl, where SCl denotes the cost of starting a low-skilled firm).
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The Value of Starting a New Firm
In terms of our analysis, this new option changes the marginal condition










(ph − SC − e(z)) = wl. (4)
This reveals the mechanism highlighted in this paper: becoming a high-
educated individual is now more attractive owing to the outside option of
opening a new firm. This will unequivocally push down the equilibrium
level   z. This, in turn, will push up the value of a high-skilled vacancy for
existing firms, so that more high-skilled vacancies will be created, which
will again increase the value of becoming high educated. Hence, ˜ V h will
increase. We summarize this result in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Giving mismatched educated workers the option of starting
a new business leads to a larger share of workers who acquire education
and to an increase in high-skilled vacancies over the basic model.
Proof. The result follows from the preceding proof. By assumption ph −
SC > βpl. Hence the e(z) solving equation (4) must be larger than the
e(z) solving (2), hence Nh is increasing. That   Vh increases follows from the
monotonicity of   Vh with respect to Nh. 
To study the effects of reduced start-up costs, we consider the compar-
ative statics of a decrease in SC. We proceed by stating the result of the
analysis in a proposition.
Proposition 3. A reduction in start-up costs (SC) implies a higher rate of
education and more vacancies for high-skilled jobs.
Proof. The comparative statics yield the following equations:
 
   z
∂
∂  z
+   ˜ V h
∂




























=−   ˜ V h
∂
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which immediately reveals signs: since (∂/∂ ˜ V h)m(Nh/ ˜ V h,1) < 0 and
(∂/∂  z)m(Nh/ ˜ V h,1) < 0, it follows that   ˜ V h and    z have opposite signs.
Manipulating the equations further, we obtain
   z
 SC
=
(1 − m(1, ˜ V h/Nh))
 
∂m(1, ˜ V h/Nh)
∂  z +
−(∂/∂  z)m(Nh/ ˜ V h,1)
(∂/∂ ˜ V h)m(Nh/ ˜ V h,1)
∂m(1, ˜ V h/Nh)
∂ ˜ V h
 
(wh − pl + SC) − e
 (  z)
(7)
  ˜ V h =    z
−(∂/∂  z)m(Nh/ ˜ V h,1)
(∂/∂ ˜ V h)m(Nh/ ˜ V h,1)
. (8)
Now, in the formula for    z/ SC, the terms with [∂m(1, ˜ V h/Nh)]/∂  z
and e (  z) are both positive, which shows that    z/ SC > 0. The feedback
effect via the negative term
−(∂/∂  z)m(Nh/ ˜ V h,1)
(∂/∂ ˜ V h)m(Nh/ ˜ V h,1)
∂m(1, ˜ V h/Nh)
∂ ˜ V h
then increases    z/ SC again. 
The analysis also shows that the first-order effect of the increased prof-
itability of education with the advent of the outside option is amplified
by the second-order effect of the increased number of vacancies that firms
provide as a reaction to the increase in the number of applicants. The result
embodies the matching externality.
IV. Some Empirical Evidence
The main prediction generated by our model is that lower start-up costs
increase the number of individuals who opt to become educated.
As an empirical indicator of such human capital formation, we use data
on educational enrollment from the UN World Development Indicators.
These are available for a large cross-section of countries. Data on start-
up costs come from two different sources: Porter et al. (2000) and Djankov
et al. (2002). The former asked executives in different countries “whether
venture capital was easy to get”.13 The latter constructed an international
database that quantified the regulation of entry of new firms. They went
13 Venture capital in our model makes it easier for educated individuals to set up their own
firm. The main role of venture capital in the literature is to lower ch, i.e., to make it easier
for existing firms to create high-skilled vacancies such as by financing R&D activities of
old firms.
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to considerable lengths to collect national information on the costs of start-
ing a new firm, including the number of procedures, and the time and
cost of obtaining legal status. Djankov et al. not only checked available
written information, but also contacted the relevant government agencies
in the countries under study and commissioned independent reports on
entry regulation from local law firms. The data on both venture capital and
regulation of entry exist only for the year 1999. This is obviously a prob-
lem in that our analysis can then only be cross-sectional. Therefore, our
empirical analyis can only establish correlations but no ultimate causation,
because we are unable to rule out problems like omitted variable bias, etc.
Figure 1 showed the relation between the “ease in obtaining venture cap-
ital” and tertiary school enrollment for 58 countries. These indicators have
a very high correlation of 0.69. Likewise, the variable “log(days to obtain
legal status)” has a very significant negative correlation with tertiary enroll-
ment for 83 countries;14 see Figure 2. Very similar relations are obtained
for secondary school enrollment rates.15
Table 1 reports correlations between our two schooling indicators and
four different indicators for start-up costs: the venture capital indicator,
time needed to obtain legal status, costs associated with obtaining legal
status and the number of procedures which are necessary to start a firm.
All of these indicators are highly correlated with each other and with school
enrollment.
In a further step, we attempted to correlate school enrollment—either in
tertiary or secondary education—with our different indicators for start-up
costs, using each indicator in turn because of the high correlations among
each other. As further control variables we used some available indicators
for school enrollment: GDP per head, total public spending on education,16
the illiteracy rate of adult males, the unemployment rate of youths, and an
indicator for the share of urban population in the country. It can be argued
14 The number of countries in the statistical samples is somewhat smaller due to miss-
ing variables problems for some countries (mainly African), especially related to venture
capital and high-tech sectors. The main sample consists of: Argentina, Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Czech Rep.,
Denmark, Dominican Rep., Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong,
Hungary, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Korea, Kyrgyz Repub-
lic, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia,
Singapore, Slovak Rep., Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia,
Turkey, UK, U.S., Uruguay, Venezuela and Zimbabwe.
15 Enrollment rates are gross enrollment rates, i.e., the number of students divided by the
relevant population, which might result in enrollment rates of more than 100 percent for
secondary education.
16 See e.g. Winter-Ebmer and Wirz (2002) for the relation between public funding and
enrollment in higher education in Europe.
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Table 1. Correlation between start-up indicators and school enrollment
Venture Secondary Tertiary













−0.63 0.83 0.64 1.0
Secondary school
enrollment rate
0.69 −0.53 −0.52 −0.45 1.0
Tertiary school
enrollment rate
0.73 −0.56 −0.56 −0.44 0.79 1.0
Note: Correlations including venture capital relate to 48 observations, all others to 66 observations.
that all of these variables have a direct influence on school enrollment. The
illiteracy rate of adults takes into account the intergenerational correlation
in education enrollment which is well documented in the literature; see
Solon (1999). The unemployment rate of youths can be seen as an indicator
of the opportunity costs of youth while deciding about further education.
A higher share of the population living in urban centers indicates both a
general level of development and the availability of schooling institutions.
In an effort to capture omitted variables, which might possibly influence
venture capital provision and maybe also schooling, we included the share
of employment in services as an indicator for employment structure, market
capitalization in percent of GDP as an indicator for the development of
the capital market at large, as well as the share of high-tech exports as an
indicator for technological advance in the country. Table A1 in the Appendix
shows data sources and descriptive statistics for all the variables used in
the analysis.
OLS results for tertiary enrollment are listed in Table 2 and those for sec-
ondary enrollment may be found in Table 3. In both tables we experiment
with the four different indicators for start-up regulation or venture capital
explained above. A log-linear specificaton is chosen for the start-up regu-
lation variables to allow for non-linearities in a simple way. The results are
remarkably similar across specifications. Our indicators for start-up regula-
tion always have the right sign and are statistically significant most of the
time. The assessment by executives as to whether “venture capital is easy
to get” varies in the data between a low of 1.9 and a high of 6.4. Increas-
ing this assessment by one standard deviation (0.80) would raise tertiary
enrollment by nine percentage points, which is rather high. The quantita-
tive effect of registration time is smaller: decreasing the time necessary to
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Table 2. Tertiary school enrollment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Venture capital easy to get 12.012
(3.110)∗∗
Ln(time to obtain legal −6.042
status) (2.025)∗∗
Ln(cost to obtain legal −4.332
status) (1.678)∗
Ln(number of steps to −6.985
obtain legal status) (3.786)
Unemployment rate youths 0.212 0.191 0.199 0.154
(0.173) (0.159) (0.163) (0.165)
Illiteracy rate male adults −0.266 −0.157 −0.130 −0.168
(0.149) (0.128) (0.130) (0.134)
Public expenses for −0.693 0.597 0.365 0.538
education (1.171) (0.972) (1.031) (1.080)
Ln(GDP per head) 5.147 8.782 8.273 9.022
(2.774) (1.849)∗∗ (1.926)∗∗ (1.934)∗∗
% urban population 0.132 0.072 0.017 0.098
(0.167) (0.133) (0.138) (0.139)
% of employment in 0.392 −0.001 0.169 0.038
services (0.210) (0.147) (0.156) (0.153)
Market capitalization in % −0.070 −0.036 −0.042 −0.031
of GDP (0.029)∗ (0.028) (0.029) (0.029)
Share of high-tech exports 0.065 0.010 0.029 0.011
(0.131) (0.133) (0.135) (0.139)
Observations 48 66 66
Adjusted R2 0.64 0.61 0.60 0.58
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
∗Significant at 5%; ∗∗significant at 1%.
obtain legal status by one standard deviation of our dataset (27 days) would
increase enrollment by 3.8 percentage points, similarly so for registration
costs and the number of steps to obtain legal status. The effects of the con-
trol variables (unemployment, illiteracy, public expenses, GDP and urban
population) always have the anticipated sign, but lack statistical significance
in many cases; only the coefficients of GDP and youth unemployment in
the case of secondary education are always statistically significant. The
indicators for employment structure, market capitalization and techno-
logical advance perform less well in terms of explaining educational
enrollment.
Robustness Analysis
One potential problem with these results is the possibility of missing con-
founding variables or the endogeneity of start-up costs. It could be the case
that both school enrollment as well as start-up regulation are caused by third
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Table 3. Secondary school enrollment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Venture capital easy to get 12.102
(5.271)∗
Ln(time to obtain legal −9.367
status) (2.931)∗∗
Ln(cost to obtain legal −4.646
status) (2.520)
Ln(number of steps to −12.143
obtain legal status) (5.465)∗
Unemployment rate youths 0.613 0.626 0.600 0.576
(0.293)∗ (0.230)∗∗ (0.244)∗ (0.238)∗
Illiteracy rate male adults −0.107 −0.048 0.010 −0.070
(0.253) (0.185) (0.195) (0.194)
Public expenses for 0.062 0.304 0.431 0.052
education (1.985) (1.407) (1.548) (1.559)
Ln(GDP per head) 11.537 14.432 14.235 14.712
(4.701)∗ (2.677)∗∗ (2.892)∗∗ (2.792)∗∗
% urban population 0.003 0.048 −0.007 0.092
(0.283) (0.193) (0.207) (0.201)
% of employment in 0.195 0.391 0.186 0.331
services (0.357) (0.213) (0.235) (0.221)
Market capitalization in % −0.076 −0.050 −0.049 −0.045
of GDP (0.048) (0.040) (0.044) (0.042)
Share of high-tech exports 0.009 0.086 0.111 0.084
(0.222) (0.193) (0.203) (0.201)
Observations 48 66 66 66
Adjusted R2 0.52 0.60 0.56 0.57
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
∗Significant at 5%; ∗∗significant at 1%.
factors such as the climate towards entrepreneurship. Angrist and Krueger
(1999) discuss the possibility of checking for exogeneity of a variable by
examining situations where the variable should definitely have no impact.
In our case, we might assume that start-up costs should have no influence
on primary school enrollment, because—according to the model—start-up
costs only matter for high-skilled workers. The presence of significant
effects of our measures of start-up costs on primary education as well
would be cause for concern. Such an “irrelevant” correlation would be a
sign that something else is hiding behind this coefficient: most likely the
influence of third variables. Table 4 reports results from such regressions,
where the dependent variable now is enrollment in primary school. We
report only the coefficients for the start-up cost indicators: all indicators
are insignificant and show the wrong sign. There is definitively no corre-
lation between start-up costs and primary school enrollment.
In another attempt to deal with potential endogeneity, we instrumented
start-up costs by political variables which can be argued to affect start-up
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Table 4. Primary school enrollment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Venture capital easy to get −1.887
(3.167)
Ln(time to obtain legal 2.645
status) (1.957)
Ln(cost to obtain legal 0.860
status) (1.615)
Ln(number of steps to 3.295
obtain legal status) (3.530)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Regressions also include all variables contained in Table 2.
∗Significant at 5%; ∗∗significant at 1%.
costs directly but school enrollment only indirectly. The essential reason
for this is that political decisions can almost immediately affect start-up
costs, but not education enrollment. In the short run, enrollment levels
are the result of choices made by students and not current government,
which makes the effect of political decisions indirect, at least in the short
run. As our instruments we used data on the political system from Botero,
Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2003) and Djankov et al.
(2002).17
Tables 5 and 6 report our IV estimates for the different start-up indi-
cators.18 The signs of the coefficients of the instrumented variables are
always as expected and fairly similar to the OLS results. The coefficients
are of comparable size and seven out the eight relevant coefficients are sta-
tistically significant at the 5 percent level. To test for the relevance of our
instruments, we included indicators for the goodness of fit of the first-stage
regressions, i.e., the marginal R2 and an F-test for the joint significance
of the instruments in the first-stage regression. The explanatory power of
the instruments, i.e., the marginal R2, is relatively high, but the F-values
for the instruments are in most cases below 5, which is probably due to
the small sample size having given rise to high standard errors. The Sargan
test for over-identification fails in some specifications, especially in the
case of tertiary enrollment and venture capital (colunm 1 in Table 5). This
can be interpreted to imply that at least one of the instruments has a direct
effect on tertiary enrollment independent of the effect via venture capital
17 These include: (1) party affiliation: the percentage of years between 1975 and 1995 dur-
ing which the party of the chief executive and the largest party in Congress had a leftist
orientation; (2) indicators for the origin of the legal system; (3) an indicator for autocracy to
describe the “general closedness of political institutions”; and (4) an indicator for property
rights.
18 Details on the instrumentation are given in the Appendix, Table A2.
C   The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics 2006.sjoe˙455 SJOE2006.cls (1994/07/13 v1.2u Standard LaTeX document class) 5-16-2006 :576
Reducing start-up costs for new firms 333
Table 5. Tertiary school enrollment—IV estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Venture capital easy to get 16.041
(7.227)∗
Ln(time to obtain legal status) −4.267
(2.180)∗
Ln(cost to obtain legal status) −5.031
(2.409)∗
Ln(number of steps to obtain −7.614
legal status) (4.454)
Observations 47 62 62 62
Marginal R2 0.16 0.28 0.40 0.56
F-test 0.83 2.52 4.47 8.39
Sargan over-identification test 15.19 14.93 14.48 13.34
Prob. >chi2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Regressions also include all variables contained in Table 2.
∗Significant at 5%; ∗∗significant at 1%.
Marginal R2 reports the increase in R2 once the instruments are added on top of the other exogenous variables
in the first-stage regression.
F-test for joint significance of instruments in the first-stage regression.
Sargan over-identification test (with prob.-value) tests the joint null hypotheses that the instruments are
uncorrelated with the error term and the second stage is correctly specified.
and different from the independent effect of the other instruments.19 The
instrumental variable results for secondary school enrollment (columns 3
and 4 in Table 6) are the most supportive of our predictions. All
the other IV results are somewhat problematic due to the small sam-
ple size and incompatibility of the instruments, even though the point
estimates of the coefficients of the instrumented variables are always as
expected.
V. Conclusions and Discussion
In this paper we attempt to shed new light on the discussion about start-
up costs for new firms. Whereas the standard argument in favor of lower
start-up costs is that mismatched workers can then set up their own firm,
we argue that lower start-up costs also provide incentives for education.
This is because new firms (at least those with expansive potential) are
often set up by high-skilled workers. Lower start-up costs therefore not
only increase production but also lead to a higher proportion of individuals
who choose high-skilled education. In the presence of search frictions, this
19 This might be due to the fact that—while the venture capital indicator relates to the finan-
cial infrastructure of the country—the other three indicators are related to legal circumstances
which are more responsive to political and legal factors.
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Table 6. Secondary school enrollment—IV estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Venture capital easy to get 21.586
(11.968)∗
Ln(time to obtain legal status) −8.740
(4.302)∗
Ln(cost to obtain legal status) −8.442
(4.087)∗
Ln(number of steps to obtain −13.025
legal status) (6.434)∗
Observations 47 62 62 62
Marginal R2 0.16 0.28 0.40 0.56
F-test 0.83 2.52 4.47 8.39
Sargan over-identification test 6.09 6.65 8.20 7.53
Prob. >chi2 0.41 0.35 0.22 0.27
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Regressions also include all variables contained in Table 2.
∗Significant at 5%; ∗∗significant at 1%.
Marginal R2 reports the increase in R2 once the instruments are added on top of the other exogenous variables
in the first-stage regression.
F-test for joint significance of instruments in the first-stage regression.
Sargan over-identification test (with prob.-value) tests the joint null hypotheses that the instruments are
uncorrelated with the error term and the second stage is correctly specified.
improvement in the skill composition of the labor force can furthermore
increase the number of high-skilled vacancies. A corollary is that incumbent
firms—which are supposed to lose in general from increased competition—
can also gain from reduced start-up costs via the skill-composition effect
that reduces the tightness of the job market for high-skilled labor.
We present some preliminary evidence on the effects of start-up costs on
enrollment, which basically supports our model. It has to be said, however,
that these results rely only on cross-country data, which do not allow us
to control for many country-specific influences on school enrollment. This
arises from the scarcity of comparable data on start-up costs at this time.
Our results also reflect on the discussion as to whether education actu-
ally provides skills or merely serves as a signal of ex-ante existing skills.
Our theoretical model assumes that education improves the skill level of a
worker and has no signaling function. In a signaling model of education,
workers have to provide an education certificate to signal their quality; no
such signal is needed to be your own boss. Lower start-up costs in a signal-
ing context would therefore reduce the incentive for (ex-ante) high-potential
individuals to invest in the signal. Then, empirical evidence should reveal
that lower set-up costs lead to lower tertiary education rates. Here, the
empirical evidence suggests otherwise and hence supports the theory that
at least some skill acquisition takes place during education.
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Appendix
Table A1. Descriptive statistics and data sources
Source Mean Standard deviation
Tertiary enrollment rate WDI 36.01 19.92
Secondary enrollment rate WDI 87.15 28.47
Primary enrollment rate WDI 95.23 7.11
Easiness of venture capital Porter et al. 3.99 0.80
Cost of obtaining legal status, log Djankov et al. −1.83 1.29
Time to obtain legal status, log Djankov et al. 3.47 0.93
No. of procedures to obtain legal status, log Djankov et al. 2.17 0.53
Youth unemployment rate (15-24 years) WDI 17.06 10.02
Illiteracy rate, total adult males WDI 10.66 12.60
Public spending on education in % of GDP WDI 4.76 1.78
GDP per capita, log WDI 8.41 1.47
Urban population, % of total WDI 66.80 18.52
Share of employment in services WDI 58.16 14.72
Market capitalization in % of GDP WDI 64.92 77.55
Share of high-tech products in exports WDI 13.98 14.21
Chief executive’s party has center-left
orientation, 1975-1995
Botero et al. 0.586 0.37
Largest party in Congress has center-left
orientation, 1975-1995
Botero et al. 0.647 0.36
Legal origin, French Djankov et al. 0.379 0.49
Legal origin, Socialist Djankov et al. 0.227 0.42
Legal origin, Scandinavian Djankov et al. 0.061 0.24
Legal origin, English Djankov et al. 0.257 0.44
Property rights, index (0–1) Djankov et al. 0.713 0.23
Table A2. First-stage regressions for IV
Venture Ln(number of
capital Ln(time) Ln(cost) steps)
Chief executive’s party −0.418 0.269 0.302 0.095
has left or center orientation (0.443) (0.453) (0.616) (0.217)
Legislature has left 0.751 −0.115 −0.047 −0.020
or center orientation (0.668) (0.495) (0.673) (0.237)
Legal origin: base German
French 0.123 0.081 −0.739 −0.137
(0.417) (0.423) (0.575) (0.203)
Socialist 0.030 −0.278 −1.212 −0.400
(0.568) (0.490) (0.667) (0.235)
Scandinavian 0.213 −0.855 −1.487 −0.731
(0.592) (0.559) (0.760) (0.268)∗∗
English 0.369 −1.125 −1.749 −0.916
(0.388) (0.405)∗∗ (0.551)∗∗ (0.194)∗∗
Property rights index 0.882 −1.211 −1.016 −0.744
(0.879) (0.730) (0.993) (0.351)∗
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Regressions also include all variables contained in Table 2.
∗Significant at 5%; ∗∗significant at 1%.
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